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Andrew B. Dawson*
This article analyzes the role of labor unions in corporate reorganizations
and argues that labor union participationcan improve corporategovernance in
the bankruptcy context. Generally, when a unionized corporation seeks to reorganize in bankruptcy, it does so with an eye towards obtaining concessions from
its labor unions. The Bankruptcy Code permits corporatedebtors to reject their
collective bargainingagreements and to impose reduced wages and benefits, thus
placing labor unions in a position of bargainingover concessions in bankruptcy.
Such concession bargaining is vitally important to the labor union and to the
debtor's reorganizationefforts; however, the focus on concession bargainingoverlooks the more activist role labor unions can, and do, play in corporate bankruptcy governance.
Labor unions have long played an important governance role when a corporation has suffered financial distress and sought protection under the Bankruptcy Code. This was true during the struggles of Pan Am Airlines in the late
1980s, and it was true in the more recent struggles of American Airlines. Current bankruptcy practice, characterized by a competition among creditors for
control of the distressed corporation, has created an environment in which such
laborparticipationis increasingly likely to occur. Further, labor participationin
the current dynamics of Chapter 11 reorganizationsmay be especially important for corporate governance in this setting. Labor unions, with their inside
information as to the corporation's practices and their unique perspective of
managerialconduct, may improve decision making in the bankruptcy context by
providing greater information about the bankrupt firm. In the competitive market for corporate control, such information may be a valuable currency that can
help improve outcomes in Chapter 11 cases.
If labor union participationcan improve upon bankruptcy governance, it is
worthwhile to consider whether in an era of ever-decreasing unionization the
bankruptcy laws could be changed in order to provide representation to nonunionized employees. While such committees are already permissible under cur*Associate Professor, University of Miami School of Law. I would like to thank Sergio Campos,
Francis Hill, Felix Mormann, Dennis Lynch, Chrystin Ondersma, Elliott Manning, Cesar Rosado, Steven
R. Schwartz, William H. Widen, the participants at the 2013 LatCrit Conference, and my colleagues at
the University of Miami faculty workshop for helpful comments or discussions. In addition, thanks to
Kayleigh McEnany, Evan Stroman, Samuel Winikoff, and Dan Wolfe for excellent research assistance.
Any errors are my own.
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rent bankruptcy law, they are rarely used, in part, because of their perceived
costs. The value contributed by labor union participation, however, suggests
that these costs should be reconsidered in light of the benefits such committees
can provide.
INTRODUCTION
Labor unions have received considerable attention in several recent high
profile bankruptcies, from the corporate reorganizations of American Airlines
and Hostess Bakeries to the municipal bankruptcy of the city of Detroit.
Popular media has either blamed labor unions for their employers' financial
distress or expressed dismay when bankruptcy law is used as a "union busting" procedure.' The academic literature in this area has focused on the appropriate legal standard for determining whether a debtor should be
permitted to reject its collective bargaining agreements in bankruptcy and on
determining the consequences of rejection. 2 These discussions have focused
principally on concession bargaining: should corporate debtors be able to use
bankruptcy as a lever to obtain concessions from labor unions? That is, these
discussions cast labor unions as concession bargaining agents in bankruptcy.
Missing from this discussion is the role labor unions have played in developing and negotiating for a reorganization plan for their employers. Labor
unions have shaped corporate reorganization plans by playing the role of activist stakeholder in addition to, or instead of, their traditional role of concession bargaining agent. For example, the labor union representing the bakers
in Hostess Bakeries effectively forced the company to forego a stand-alone
reorganization and instead liquidate the business, and the pilots' union pushed
American Airlines away from a stand-alone reorganization and towards a
merger with US Airways.3
Labor unions' roles as activist stakeholder and concession bargaining
agent are interrelated, as illustrated in the American Airlines bankruptcy in
Part II infra, in which the pilots' union ultimately made concessions to the
'See, e.g., Michael Brownfield, Big Labor DragsAmerican Airlines into Bankruptcy, THE DAILY SIGNAL
(November 29, 2011), http://www.dailysignal.com/2011/11/29/big-labor-drugs-american-airlines-intobankruptcy; Jordan Weissman, Who's to Blame for the Hostess Bankruptcy: Wall Street, Unions, or Carbs?,
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 16, 2012, 6:02 PM), available at http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/
2012/11/whos-to-blame-for-the-hostess-bankruptcy-wall-street-unions-orcarbs/265357.
2
See, e.g., Christopher D. Cameron, How "Necessary" Became the Mother of Rejection: An Empirical
Look at the Fate of Collective BargainingAgreements on the Tenth Anniversary of Bankruptcy Code Section
1113, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 841, 869 (1994); Marc S. Kirschner, Willis J. Goldsmith, Lawrence P.
Gottesman, Deena B. Jenab, & Jay G. Swardenski, Tossing the Coin Under Section 1113: Heads or Tails,
the Union Wins, 23 SETON HALL L. REV. 1534-35 (1993); Michael St. Patrick Baxter, Is There a Claim
for Damages from the Rejection of a Collective Bargaining Agreement Under Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy
Code?, 12 BANK. DEV. J. 703, 721-22 (1993).
'See infra section II.

2015)

LABOR ACTIVISM IN BANKRUPTCY

99

-

airline as part of its strategy with the creditors to push the airline towards a
merger. This article distinguishes these two roles analytically, "unbundling"
labor union's stakeholder activism from the collective bargaining role.4 Disaggregating these functions facilitates evaluation of labor unions' activist role
("labor union activism") separate from their role in collective bargaining. It
further helps begin the conversation for considering the potential role of nonunionized employees in bankruptcy, a much larger topic that is worth considering given the declining unionization rate of American workers.
Labor union activism in bankruptcy is not a new phenomenon, but current corporate reorganization practice potentially makes labor participation
increasingly an important factor in bankruptcy decision making. Labor unions played a role in the reorganizations of Pan Am and Frontier Airlines in
the 1980s just as they played a role in the recent reorganization of American
Airlines.5 Recent corporate reorganization practice, however, has created
governance dynamics in bankruptcy that create both greater opportunities
and greater incentives for labor unions to participate in corporate decision
making in the Chapter 11 context.
As Professors Ayotte and Morrison have argued based on their empirical
examination of corporate reorganizations, bankruptcy governance has become
characterized by the competition for control among various creditor groups.6
Creditor competition has turned corporate reorganization into a forum for
market-based solutions to financial distress.7 This creditor competition can
make labor unions' interests-already vulnerable given the Bankruptcy Code
authority for corporate debtors to reject collective bargaining agreements
even more vulnerable, as creditor groups may target labor costs in order to
4

The concept of "unbundling" representation from collective bargaining is based on Benjamin I. Sachs's
article The Unbundled Union: Politics Without Collective Bargaining, 123 YALE L. J. 148, 182 (2013), in
which he discusses the unbundling of the collective bargaining function of labor unions from their political
representation function.
'See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Labor and the Corporate Structure: Changing Conceptions and

Emerging Possibilities, 55 U. CaL. L. REv. 73, 75-76 (1988).
6

See Kenneth M. Ayotte & Edward R. Morrison, Creditor Control and Conflict in Chapter 11, 1 J.
LEGAL ANALYsIs 511 (2009) and discussion infra in section I.A; see also Michelle M. Harner, The Search
for an Unbiased Fiduciary in Corporate Reorganizations, 86 NOTE DAME L. REV. 469, 473 (2011) ("The
goals of the corporation and its new set of creditors can and often do conflict. In addition, intercreditor
conflict can develop as creditors compete for control of the corporation's restructuring. Consequently, the
corporation's Chapter 11 bankruptcy case can become a battleground for resolving conflict rather than a
neutral site for building consensus.").
7

Jonathan

C. Lipson & Christopher M. DiVirgilio, Controlling the Market for Information in Reorgani-

zation, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 647, 654 (2010) ("The marketization of business failure has been
driven largely by two phenomena: (1) the growth of secondary markets for claims against distressed firms,
and (2) the growth of large, private pools of capital that purchase these claims, or other interests in, or
assets of, troubled companies.") (footnote omitted).
81l U.S.C. § 1113 provides for the rejection of collective bargaining agreements, discussed in greater
detail infra in section II.
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maximize returns on their claims against the debtor.9
At the same time, in this marketplace for corporate control of the distressed firm, information about the firm is a valuable commodity,o and labor
unions may have information about the firm that other stakeholders and interested parties may lack. Labor unions, consequently, can play a significant
role in current corporate bankruptcy dynamics.
This article argues that this information-sharing function from labor unions has the potential to improve bankruptcy governance. That is, by sharing
information about the distressed firm, labor union participation in corporate
reorganizations may make it more likely that bankruptcy will maximize returns to creditors. Currently, corporate reorganizations have been criticized
for facilitating asset fire sales that benefit no one other than the secured creditors." These sales have been criticized as being procedurally unfair' 2, as
distorting resource allocation decisions' 3 , and as failing to maximize the value
of the assets.1 4 Even though bankruptcy asset sales have the potential to
maximize a debtor's assets by enabling the debtor to sell the assets free of all
claims and interests, these asset sales have been shown to yield below market
returns.' 5
The ideal solution to improving bankruptcy governance may be through
amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, such as by creating an unbiased "case
facilitator," as suggested by Michelle Harner.1 6 Labor union activism, how9
See, e.g., David A. Skeel, Jr., Employees, Pensions, and Governance in Chapter 11, 82 WASH. U. L. Q.
1469, 1481 (2004) (discussing role of controlling creditor in pushing the debtor to seek concessions from

labor unions and citing the first US Airways bankruptcy as an example).

"oLipson & DiVirgilio, supra note 7, at 655 ("Like all markets, the market for control of distressed
firms depends on two things: money and information.").

"Charles J. Tabb, Credit Bidding, Security, and the Obsolescence of Chapter 11, 2013 U. ILL.

L. REV.

103, 105 (2013) ("One shot that those senior secured lenders call repeatedly is to sell the firm's assets,
lock, stock, and barrel, in the incipient stages of the case.").
"Id. at 143 (arguing that a secured creditor's right to credit bid at such sales turns bankruptcy into
little more than a foreclosure sale).
3
" Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 6, at 511 ("We also find that bargaining between secured and
unsecured creditors can distort the reorganization process. A Chapter 11 case is significantly more likely
to result in a sale if secured lenders are oversecured, consistent with a secured creditor-driven fire-sale bias.
A sale is much less likely when these lenders are undersecured or when the firm has no secured debt at all.
Our results suggest that the advent of creditor control has not eliminated the fundamental inefficiency of
the bankruptcy process: resource allocation questions (whether to sell or reorganize a firm) are ultimately
confounded with distributional questions (how much each creditor will receive) due to conflict among
creditor classes.").

"Lynn M. LoPucki & Joseph W. Doherty, Bankruptcy Fire Sales, 106 MicH. L. REV. 1, 4 (2007)
(presenting empirical support for argument "that creditors and shareholders can more than double their
recoveries by reorganizing large public companies instead of selling them").
uAnne M. Anderson & Yung-Yu Ma, Acquisitions in Bankruptcy: 363 Sales Versus Plan Sales and the
Existence of Fire Sales, 22 AM. BANKR. INsT. L. REv. 1, 17 (2014).
'6Harner, supra note 6, at 475 ("This Article suggests an alternative approach for preserving estate
value in the Chapter 11 context: a third-party neutral appointed by the court to participate in the process.
The Article refers to this neutral as a 'case facilitator.").
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ever, may be a second-best solution in the absence of legislative reform. Labor union activism has the potential to provide a valuable counterbalance to
creditor control. Labor unions tend to hold a long position in the debtoremployer, and therefore would likely favor rehabilitation over an asset sale.
In addition, labor unions may be able to contribute information that would
help evaluate the decision to sell as well as the sale value.
Labor union activism will likely impose some costs, as labor unions are
likely biased towards reorganization, even when reorganization may not be in
the interest of all creditors.' 7 Labor union activism, according to some, may
also impose costs as labor unions may seek to impose a plan of reorganization
that fails to recognize changing economic realities.18 And from an allocative
efficiency standpoint, bankruptcy governance should be in the hands of the
residual claimants, i.e., those stakeholders who stand to reap the marginal gain
and to suffer the marginal loss of bankruptcy investment decisions.1 9 While
scholars struggle to identify which creditors share these attributes, it is
highly unlikely labor unions would ever be the residual claimants.
Ultimately, though, because labor union activism operates through Chapter 11's marketplace for corporate control, it will be the market that determines whether the benefits of labor union activism outweigh their costs.
This, again, is not a perfect solution to current bankruptcy governance
problems. Labor unions introduce their own bias into the reorganization proceeding, and with the decline of unionization in this country, labor union
presence in corporate reorganizations is likewise declining. Nonetheless, it is
the hope of this article to separate the activist-type role of labor unions from
the traditional bargaining role. Perhaps by separating activism from traditional bargaining, it will be possible to imagine a role for non-unionized employees to play an activist role through committee representation in Chapter
11.
This article begins in Part I by situating labor union activism within the
dynamics of corporate governance in Chapter 11 reorganizations. This first
part of the paper describes the traditional concession bargaining role of labor
17

Harvey R. Miller, Michele J. Meises & Christopher Marcus, The State of the Unions in Reorganization and Restructuring Cases, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 465, 483 (2007) (arguing that granting a
rejection damage claim to labor unions would make reorganization more difficult because "[t]he objectives
of the union and those of other creditors may be adverse and prejudice the prospects of reorganization.").
'ald. at 497 ("Unfortunately, many labor representatives are caught in a time warp and believe that
the economy still is operating in the economic climate of the 1950s and 1960s."); see also Hon. William T.
Bodoh & Beth A. Buchanan, Ignored Consequences-The Conflicting Policies of Labor Law and Business
Reorganization and Its Impact on Organized Labor, 15 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 395, 413 (2007) (observing that "[i]n the end, a union's effort in forestalling a debtor's reorganization is a hollow victory if the
debtor's reorganizing efforts ultimately fail" and then collecting cases at note 89).
9
' See Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 6, at 539 (concluding that creditor conflict can result in a
misallocation of resources because it puts resource allocation decisions in the hands of non-residual
claimants).
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unions in bankruptcy. It then considers how creditor competition in Chapter
11 governance has affected this concession bargaining, with a particular focus
on the prominence of creditor-driven asset fire sales. This first part concludes
by considering how this creditor competition and resultant market place for
corporate control can enable labor unions to impact the reorganization
process.
Part II of the paper illustrates these dynamics through three case studies,
the first two of Hostess Bakeries as it made its way through bankruptcy first
in 2004 and then again in 2012, only three years after emerging from its first
attempted reorganization. The third case study is that of American Airlines,
which filed for bankruptcy protection in 2011. The airline filed bankruptcy
in an attempt to cut labor costs and emerge as a stand-alone entity. It
emerged from bankruptcy by merging with US Airways, in part due to the
influence of the airline pilots' labor union.
Part III evaluates labor participation from a bankruptcy policy perspective. Even though bankruptcy policy can be readily reduced to a simple
statement that bankruptcy law should preserve a debtor's going concern
value and maximize the value of its assets, in practice this statement poses
significant difficulties, as these two goals may be in direct tension. Furthermore, evaluating whether a particular reorganization maximizes the value of
assets requires a comparison with a hypothetical valuation of alternative
courses of action. Valuation problems make it difficult, if not impossible to
determine whether any particular course of action is value maximizing.
Nonetheless, this section urges that the current market for corporate control
can provide a market-based means of ensuring assets are put to their most
efficient use. This market for corporate control, however, depends in part on
creditors' access to information about the corporation. Labor union participation can potentially provide additional information to the reorganization process in order to improve chances that the reorganization plan will in fact
maximize the debtor's assets. Whether labor union participation will perform
this role is market-driven-labor unions can effect change only to the extent
that other creditors place a value on the information unions can provide.
Part IV then briefly considers whether, in an era of very low (and declining) unionization, bankruptcy governance may be improved by the appointment of a committee to represent non-unionized workers. Such committees
already are permissible under the Bankruptcy Code, but when they are appointed, they are generally viewed as a litigation vehicle to determine employee claims against the debtor's estate. An employee committee could, in
theory, be appointed to serve the functions that have been performed by
labor unions: represent employees' ongoing interest in their employer and provide a means for employees to "sell" their information value to other creditors. While there would be costs and complexities in appointing an employee
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committee for this purpose, this article suggests that it is worth considering
the use of such an employee committee in some cases in order to improve
bankruptcy governance. Part V then concludes.
I. LABOR UNIONS: CONCESSION BARGAINING AND
ACTIVISM
Current scholarship and media attention on unionized workers in bankruptcy have focused on the employer's ability to use bankruptcy law to cut
wages and benefits. The Bankruptcy Code gives debtors a powerful tool not
available otherwise: debtors can reject their unexpired collective bargaining
agreements. 20 Collective bargaining agreements are contract-like agreements
between an employer and a group of employees that have elected to be collectively represented. The National Labor Relations Act requires that employers and employee representatives bargain "with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment .

.

. but such obligations does not

compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession." 2 1 Under the Railway Labor Act, this duty to bargain is even higher, as
carriers and employees have a duty "to exert every reasonable effort to make
and maintain agreements concerning rates of pay, rules, and working conditions, and to settle all disputes."22
Even though labor laws do not require the parties to enter collective
bargaining agreements, once the parties enter an agreement they are not allowed to modify it while in effect. To deviate from the collective bargaining
agreement is to commit an unfair labor practice. 2 3
Bankruptcy law provides a way around this through § 1113, which provides that a debtor may reject a collective bargaining agreement. 24 The
debtor must satisfy several procedural requirements, such as giving a proposal
to the unions listing desired modifications to the collective bargaining agreement, meeting with the union, and providing the union with sufficient information to evaluate the proposal.25 If the union rejects the proposal, the court
can authorize the debtor to reject the collective bargaining agreement if it
finds that the union's rejection was without cause and that the proposed
modifications are necessary for the debtor to reorganize. 26
While this process in theory provides for a bargaining role for labor unions in corporate reorganizations, it restricts that bargaining role to the narU.S.C. § 1113 (2004).
U.S.C. § 158(d) (2006).
2245 U.S.C. § 152 (2006).
2329 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (a)(5) (2006).
2411 U.S.C. § 1113 (2004).
25
Id. § 1113(b) (2004).
6
Id. § 1113(c) (2004).
2011

2129
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row range of labor law's mandatory bargaining subjects, that is, wages and
benefits.2 7 It does not open the door to the union negotiating over whether
the debtor should seek to reorganize its balance sheet, sell divisions of the
corporation, or merge in bankruptcy.
Private employers (and even municipalities now, as seen in the bank,
ruptcy filings of Detroit and Stockton, California) have invoked the power to
reject collective bargaining agreements as a central part of their reorganization strategy. Bankruptcy professionals have dubbed such cases as "labor
transformation cases." 2 8

Most of the academic literature in this area has focused on labor unions'
role in participating in concession bargaining under § 1113, evaluating
whether bankruptcy law adequately protects labor law policies in bankruptcy or whether § 1113's standards make it too inviting for a debtor to file
a "labor transformation case."
Some have argued that this power to reject is an important one to maximize returns to creditors and to preserve jobs for employees. They have
further argued that labor unions retain sufficient negotiation leverage in bankruptcy through their right to strike (although that right has been called into
29 30
question for airline bankruptcies under the Railway Labor Act ).
Others have argued that the power to reject has turned bankruptcy from
a vehicle for corporate rehabilitation into a tool for busting unions. Labor
unions for years have sought to amend the Bankruptcy Code provisions deal"Donald R. Korobkin, Employee Interests in Bankruptcy, 4 Am. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 29 (1996)
('Furthermore, the influence of a union is generally limited to subjects covered by the collective bargaining
agreement. Fundamental business policy remains securely within the zone of 'managerial prerogative.' As a
consequence, even employees represented by a union may have only a marginal voice on many of the
debtor's most important decisions."); see also James Friedman, Keeping Big Issues Off the Table: The Su-

preme Court on EntrepreneurialDiscretionand the Duty to Bargain, 37 ME. L. REV. 223 (1985) (regarding
distinction between mandatory and non-mandatory subjects of bargaining under labor laws).
"Babette A. Ceccotti, Lost in Transformation: The Disappearanceof Labor Policies in Applying Sec-

tion 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 415, 417 (2007) ("How, then, to explain
the wave of bankruptcy cases targeting significant reductions in labor costs, pension funding, and retiree
health obligations that has surged through the airline industry, the steel industry, auto supply and other
heavily unionized industries in recent years? Restructuring professionals have denominated these cases
'labor transformation' bankruptcies. They have in common the strategic use of bankruptcy to bring about
broad changes to a business, largely through substantial cost-cutting, to address conditions that are
ascribed to fundamental industry change.") (footnotes omitted).
29

See Nw. Airlines Corp. v. Assn of Flight Attendants-CWA (In re Nw. Airlines Corp.), 483 F.3d 160,
164 (2d Cir. 2007); Richard M. Seltzer & Thomas N. Ciantra, The Return of Government by Injunction in

Airline Bankruptcies, 15 Am. Bankr. Inst. L. Rev. 499, 500 (2007).
"oMiller, Meises & Marcus, supra note 17, at 495 ("As Delphi and similar cases demonstrate, despite a
potentially favorable result from a rejection motion for the DIP, unions still possess a powerful ability to
cripple a debtor's business and possibly prejudice the debtor's customers. The threat and power to strike
can be overwhelming. Consequently, it is hard to conclude that the power of organized labor has substantially diminished in the chapter 11 context.") (footnote omitted).
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ing with collective bargaining agreements in order to remove the incentive
for debtors to commence labor transformation cases.
For purposes of this article, it is not necessary to evaluate the merits of
these arguments. It is enough to note that a bankruptcy filing places labor
union interests at risk. Labor unions can oppose any motion to reject a collective bargaining agreement, but this involves expensive litigation. Furthermore, empirically, debtors' rejection motions are always successful in the
end.3 Indeed, labor unions' interests may be placed at further risk due to
creditor control in bankruptcy. As discussed in Part A below, creditors may
exert greater control over a corporation that is suffering financial distress or
that has filed bankruptcy. This control, as discussed in Part B, can increase
the chances that a debtor will use bankruptcy to target labor costs.
Part B below concludes by examining how the concessionary bargaining
framework creates incentives for labor unions to play a role beyond that of
concession bargaining. It further considers how creditor control creates opportunities for labor unions to play more of an active role in plan
negotiations.
A. CREDITOR CONTROL AND COMPETITION
When corporate debtors suffer financial distress and file bankruptcy,
creditors are able to exercise increased control over corporate decision making.3 2 Institutional lenders may exert control either by lending money to the
corporation or by acquiring debts owed by the corporation.
For those institutional lenders that lend new money to a company, control over the corporation comes in the form of extensive loan covenants in the
loan agreement that may "cover[ ] everything from minimum cash receipts to
timely delivery of audited financial statements."33 These covenants "serve as
trip wires for the lender's right to accelerate and enforce or to intervene in
n1Andrew B. Dawson, Collective BargainingAgreements in CorporateReorganizations, 84 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 103, 117 (2010) (reporting results of empirical study of all large publicly traded corporations filed
between 2001-2007, finding that debtors were able to reject collective bargaining agreements in every
litigated motion. Delta Airlines was the sole case in which a court denied a motion, but with leave to
amend. The motion was ultimately granted).
32Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Private Debt and the Missing Lever of Corporate Governance, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 1209, 1231 (2006) ("The desire of a lender to gain control when a business
becomes financially distressed should come as no surprise. Much of the literature on corporate governance
is aimed at reducing agency costs when times are good. In that situation, managers may have an incentive
to pursue private benefits rather than maximize shareholder wealth. Things change when distress occurs.
Distress often foreshadows the replacement of managers and directors. They know that they are in the end
game. Final-period problems tend to reduce the efficacy of controls designed to bind managers over the
long term. Left unchecked, managers are even more likely to put their interests ahead of those of the
company. Lenders thus institute a new set of controls in order to protect their interests.") (footnotes
omitted); Frederick Tung, Leverage in the Board Room: The Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance, 57 UCLA L. REv. 115, 120 (2009).
"Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 32, at 1211; Tung, supra note 32, at 125.
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the borrower's decisions,"34 giving the lender "de facto control rights-such
as replacing the CEO of a company-that shareholders of a public company
simply do not have."35 Empirical studies suggest that lenders frequently exercise these control rights, as it has been found that CEOs were replaced in up
to seventy percent of corporations that ended up filing for bankruptcy.3 6
Likewise, institutional lenders may acquire the debts of a financially
troubled company in an effort to exert control over the company by influencing management or by acquiring the company." These lenders may acquire a
financially troubled corporation's bonds, notes, and even trade debt from
lenders, bondholders, and suppliers who may prefer to avoid the costs associated with the debtor's default. Those institutional lenders that acquire such
debts are referred to as distressed debt investors. Some of these investors
may simply be purchasing debts at a discounted rate with the goal of realizing
gains from a successful turnaround.1 8 Others may look to use their debt holdings to influence management or to exchange their claims for equity through a
restructuring.3 9
If the debtor seeks protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code,
institutional lenders may exert even greater control in corporate governance
by providing financing for the debtor's reorganization. 40 Frequently, large
corporate debtors require additional financing to carry on their business during the reorganization, to pay the restructuring professionals, and to assure
counterparties that the debtor will be able to pay the debts it incurs during
the bankruptcy. The lenders who extend this bankruptcy financing-commonly referred to as debtor-in-possession (or DIP) financing-may exert control over the debtor and the reorganization process through loan covenants,
similar to the control institutional lenders may exercise outside the bankruptcy context. 4 ' In bankruptcy, these covenants may require the debtor to
54

George G. Triantis & Ronald J. Daniels, The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance, 83

CAL. L. REV. 1073, 1093 (1995).

"Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 32, at 1211; Tung, supra note 32, at 125.
6

3 Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 6, at 522 (reporting that seventy percent of CEOs were replaced
within the two years preceding the bankruptcy, a number they believe underestimates CEO turnover
because they did not examine turnover during the reorganization process.); Ethan S. Bernstein, All's Fair in
Love, War & Bankruptcy: CorporateGovernance Implicationsof CEO Turnover in FinancialDistress, 11
STAN. J.L. Bus. & FIN. 298 (2006).
37

Michelle M. Harner, The CorporateGovernance and Public Policy Implicationsof Activist Distressed

Debt Investing, 77 FORDHAM L. REv. 703, 709 (2008).
"Id. at 715.
' 9Id. at 716.
40

David A. Skeel, Jr., Creditors' Ball: The 'New" New CorporateGovernance in Chapter 11, 152 U.

PA. L. REv. 917 (2003).
4IId.
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appoint a chief restructuring officer, to adhere to a line item budget, 42 to sell
assets by a target date, or to obtain concessions from its labor unions.4 3 Default can accelerate the loan and force the debtor into liquidation.
While DIP financing covenants are similar to those covenants by which
institutional lenders can exert "de facto control rights" outside bankruptcy, 44
the DIP financing covenants can provide even greater control rights than
would be available outside of bankruptcy.4s For instance, the DIP lender can
exert even greater control over the process of selling the debtor's assets. 46
Distressed debt investors likewise may be able to assert even greater control in the bankruptcy process. By acquiring claims in bankruptcy, these investors acquire both the distribution rights from those claims as well as the
governance rights. Creditors' governance rights include the ability to vote on
the debtor's plan of reorganization, 47 object to non-ordinary course business
decisions,4 8 and to move to replace management with a trustee.49 In addition,
creditors may exert influence over the reorganization through representation
on a statutory committee, the most frequent type being the unsecured creditors' committee. The unsecured creditors' committee, generally consisting of
the seven largest unsecured claimholders, is empowered to monitor the
debtor in bankruptcy and to participate in plan negotiations.
While many creditors may not exercise these governance rights, perhaps
because the benefits of monitoring the debtor do not justify the expense,
distressed debt investors have both the incentive and the sophistication to
participate in bankruptcy governance. They may acquire sufficient claims to
influence the plan negotiations through membership on the unsecured creditors' committee, through objecting to the debtor's reorganization decisions, or
"Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 6, at 525 (reporting that seventy-two percent of loans examined
imposed specific line-item budgets).
43
See Skeel, supra note 9, at 1481 n.66 (2004) ("The principal lender in the first U.S. Airways bankruptcy explicitly threatened to force a liquidation unless employees made substantial concessions. The
cash-flow requirements in United's DIP financing agreement were also designed with wage concessions in
mind."); see also Hostess II bankruptcy filing, discussed infra in Part II.
"Baird & Rasmussen, supra note 32, at 1211; Tung, supra note 32, at 125.
45
David A. Skeel, Jr., The Past, Present and Future of Debtor-in-PossessionFinancing, 25 CARDOzo L.
REV. 1905, 1929 (2004) (describing lock up agreements that are permissible in bankruptcy but not under
state corporate law: "outside of bankruptcy, if the managers of a company walked into court with an
agreement that transferred control over its board of directors and promised thirty-six percent of the company's stock to a Bidder, without any input from the company's shareholders, the court's most likely
response would be, 'nice try.' In the corporate law context, courts are skeptical of stock lock-ups that
commit a significant portion of a company's stock to a favored bidder, since the lock-up may exclude other
bidders from making a higher bid for the company.").
46d.
U.S.C.

§

1126 (2004).

811 U.S.C.

§

1109 (2004).

U.S.C.

§

1103 (2004).
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through seeking to appoint a trustee to replace management.5 0 The end goal
may be to increase their distribution rights, to receive equity in the reorganized entity in exchange for their claims, or to direct the sale of corporate
assets.
With bankruptcy governance being driven by DIP lenders and distressed
debt investors, corporate reorganizations have come to be characterized by
creditor competition for control.s' This conflict frequently concerns asset
sales in bankruptcy, in which DIP lenders may prefer a quick sale of the
debtor's assets while unsecured creditors prefer a traditional reorganization. 5 2
As Ayotte and Morrison demonstrated, the conflict frequently arises because
the DIP lenders (and secured lenders generally) may prefer a quick sale of
assets, particularly when their collateral value exceeds the amount of the secured indebtedness; meanwhile, unsecured creditors (including distressed
debt investors who have purchased bonds and trade debt) are more likely to
oppose sales in that scenario.5 3
Asset sales in bankruptcy have come under increased scrutiny from commentators. 54 Such sales may be a valuable means of maximizing value for
creditors. Bankruptcy law permits such sales to be made free and clear of any
claims or interests in the assets, thus allowing the purchaser to avoid the
possibility of successor liability.55 While in theory this should maximize the
value of the assets, empirical evidence demonstrates that asset sales in bankruptcy do not maximize the value of assets.5 6 Not only are such sales inefficient in many cases, but they also permit debtors to effectuate a restructuring
through a sales procedure that lacks the statutory protections that creditors
5

Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An Empirical Study of Investors' Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 84 (2008) (reporting that 65.5% of the firms surveyed said they
have used "a company's distressed debt to try to influence board or management decisions at the
company").
5
Harner, supra note 6, at 478 ("Self-dealing and control contests in corporate restructurings are becoming commonplace. As a result, conflicts and costly disputes are on the rise, and the problems associated with information asymmetry are intensifying."); Lipson & DiVirgilio, supra note 7, at 654 ("The
marketization of business failure has been driven largely by two phenomena: (1) the growth of secondary
debt markets for claims against distressed firms, and (2) the growth of large, private pools of capital that
purchase these claims, or other interests in, or assets of, troubled companies."); Ayotte & Morrison, supra
note 6, at 511.
"See LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 36-37 (summarizing the literature regarding diverging
interests of DIP lenders and the estate: "As Kenneth Ayotte, David Skeel, Douglas Baird, Robert Rasmussen, Harvey R. Miller, Shai Waisman, and others have noted, DIP lenders also have incentives with
respect to section 363 sales that conflict with those of the estate.").
"Ayotte & Morrison, supra note 6, at 534.
s 4 See, e.g., LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14; Tabb, supra note 11; Anderson & Ma, supra note 15.
ss11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (2004).
5
'LoPucki & Doherty, supra note 14, at 3-4 (finding that asset sales "yielded less than half as much
value as reorganization."); Anderson & Ma, supra note 15, at 3 ("Compared with plan sales, section 363
sales are also associated with significantly lower sales prices.").
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would receive in a traditional reorganization.57 As the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals expressed in Chrysler's reorganization, courts have recognized the
concern "that a quick, plenary sale of assets outside the ordinary course of
business risked circumventing key features of the Chapter 11 process, which
afford debt and equity holders the opportunity to vote on a proposed plan of
reorganization after receiving meaningful information."s8
B. CREDITOR CONTROL'S

IMPACT ON LABOR UNIONS

'

Creditor control can directly threaten workers' interests as creditors may
demand that management exercise its statutory right to reject its collective
bargaining agreements with its unionized workers.59 Collective bargaining
agreements set forth the terms and conditions of employment between management and the unionized workers and create a "law of the shop" that may
govern all aspects of that relationship. Outside of bankruptcy, a debtor commits an unfair labor practice if it fails to comply with the agreement. 60 Inside
of bankruptcy, a debtor may reject these agreements and then impose new
terms on those agreements without committing an unfair labor practice. 6
Creditors may directly insist on the debtor rejecting its collective bargaining
agreements by making it an event of default to fail to do so. Creditors can
also indirectly reach this result by imposing a budget on the debtor that
practically requires new labor terms. 62
Creditors can also insist on asset sales that can lead to the loss of jobs.
Further, because purchasers are not bound by the seller's collective bargaining agreements, sales can effectively terminate the workers' collective bargaining agreements. 6 3
While creditor control may threaten worker interests, the competition
also presents opportunities for workers to find alliances within the competition. Chapter 11 dynamics open up opportunities for labor to exert influence
on bankruptcy governance in at least two ways. First, a vulnerable management may be more willing to work with labor in order to avoid disruptions
"Mark J. Roe & David A. Skeel, Jr., Assessing the Chrysler Bankruptcy, 108 MIcH. L. REv. 727, 734
(2010) ("A complex sale, however, can determine priorities and terms that the Code is structured to
determine under § 1129, and is not structured to determine under § 363.").
"In re Chrysler LLC, 576 F.3d 108, 114 (2d Cir. 2009), cert. granted, vacated sub nom. Indiana State

Police Pension Trust v. Chrysler LLC, 558 U.S. 1087 (2009).
' 9 Skeel, supra note 9, at 1481 n.66 ("The principal lender in the first U.S. Airways bankruptcy explicitly threatened to force a liquidation unless employees made substantial concessions. The cash-flow requirements in United's DIP financing agreement were also designed with wage concessions in mind.").
6029 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) & (a)(5) (2004).
6
'N.L.R.B. v. Bildisco &Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513 (1984). Even though Bildisco was overruled in part by
the enactment of § 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code, this proposition remains true provided that the debtor
comply with the procedural requirements of § 1113.
62

6

1d.

"N.L.R.B. v. Burns Int'l Sec. Servs. Inc., 406 U.S. 272, 281-82 (1972).
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that could invite greater creditor control. While it is widely recognized that
a union's right to strike is largely toothless since employers have the right to
replace striking workers, 64 a strike or threat of one may have more bite in
times of financial distress. The employer may not be able to withstand a
labor interruption of even short duration in such times. Further, a strike or
labor unrest may trigger an event of default under a loan, raising the stakes in
a threatened work stoppage. At the same time, the threat of disrupting the
firm provides the union with leverage only to the extent that those in control
of the corporation prefer to avoid liquidation. As mentioned above, that may
not be the case when control is exercised by a creditor who stands to completely recover its claim in a liquidation. 6s
Second, credit dynamics change labor relations by adding bargaining partners other than existing management. Labor may bargain with senior and
junior lenders, who may look to an alliance with labor as a way to obtain
greater control over the Chapter 11 case, as well as other distressed investors
or third parties interested in acquiring a stake in the debtor.
Labor has at least two bargaining chips in these negotiations. Labor may
offer concessions to a party that seeks to acquire the corporation. For example, labor may agree to waive its right to strike or may agree to wage and
benefits cuts. In this way, labor concessions serve the function of a capital
infusion through debt forgiveness.
In addition, labor can provide valuable insight into the firm's internal operations. As recognized in the corporate governance literature, workers perform a monitoring function in identifying managerial slack. 66 With their
experience working in the corporation, workers have a perspective on internal operations that is available to few, if any, other stakeholders. For example, workers may be privy to defects in internal production proceduressomething that may be unobservable from outside the corporation. Labor
unions, bargaining on behalf of these workers, can offer this perspective and
experience to other stakeholders and potential purchasers who may lack the
monitoring power but who have the power to use that monitoring
knowledge.67
64

Craig Becker, "Better Than A Strike": ProtectingNew Forms of Collective Work Stoppages Under the

National Labor Relations Act, 61 U. CH. L. REV. 351, 353-54 (1994) ("The right to strike has been
gutted by the federal courts and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).").
65
See Skeel, supra note 4.
*6 Michael C. Harper, Reconciling Collective Bargainingwith Employee Supervision of Management, 137
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (1988); Kent Greenfield, The Place of Workers in Corporate Law, 39 B.C. L. REV.
283, 299 (1998); Triantis & Daniels, supra note 34, at 1077.
67
See Harper, supra note 66, at 16-17 (arguing that employee representatives can serve this function
for shareholders outside the bankruptcy context: "Finally, just as employee representatives can serve as a
conduit of information about the firm to unions, they also serve as a source of information to shareholder
representatives about employee interests, concerns, and needs.").
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The following section provides case studies of the Chapter 11 reorganizations of Hostess Bakeries and AMR Corp., the parent company of American
Airlines. These cases illustrate the creditor competition dynamics, how such
dynamics can target worker interests, and how labor has responded.
II. CASE STUDIES
This section examines the corporate reorganizations of Hostess Bakeries
(which filed first in 2004 as Interstate Bakeries Corporation and then again in
2012 as Hostess Bakeries) and American Airlines. These cases illustrate the
governance dynamics described above as well as the strategies pursued by
labor unions to participate in the bankruptcy governance.
A.

HOSTESS

I

'

When Hostess6 8 filed bankruptcy in 2004, it did so with the stated objectives "to make significant progress on the operational initiatives" and 'to
restructure [its] debt to levels commensurate with [its] cash flow generating
capability and industry norms." 69 Three years into the reorganization process, however, Hostess had made little to no progress. In early 2007, Hostess
installed a new CEO charged with creating a new business plan to lead the
company out of bankruptcy. 70 As part of that plan, Hostess contemplated
overhauling its product distribution structure, which would require major
concessions from delivery systems employees, who were represented by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters. It would also require financing to
fund the new business plan. In the summer of 2007, Hostess found a potential source of debt and equity financing from Silver Point Capital to fund the
new business plan, conditioned on, among other things, Hostess' obtaining
concessions from its labor unions. Hostess was able to do so from one of its
major labor unions-the Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers & Grain
Millers International Unions (the Bakers)-but not from the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters. The Teamsters, in fact, declared that bargaining
with Hostess had reached a dead end and that it would no longer negotiate
with management. 7
Around this time, Yucaipa Companies LLC, a hedge fund specializing in
turning around distressed firms, expressed interest in proposing its own plan
'"Interstate Bakeries Corporation, referred to as "Hostess" for simplicity.
' 9 Declaration of Ronald B. Hutchison in Support of Chapter 11 Petitions and First Day Motions at
17, In re Interstate Bakeries Corp., Case No. 04-45814 (Bankr. W.D. Mo., Sept. 22. 2004), Doc. 7 [hereinafter Hostess I].
70Disclosure Statement at 5, Hostess I, Case
04-45814, Doc 10133.
71
Teamsters Break Off Negotiations With Interstate Bakeries Corporation,Press Release issued by the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, Sept. 16, 2007, http://www.teamster.org/content/teamstersbreak-negotiations-interstate-bakeries-corporation.
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of reorganization. 72 The Teamsters agreed to work exclusively with Yucaipa
in formulating a plan that would involve an industry competitor, Bimbo Bakeries. 73 Yucaipa sought permission to access Hostess's records to conduct due
diligence for such a plan; however, Hostess refused access, based in part on its
discomfort with Yucaipa's undisclosed agreement with the Teamsters. 74 Finally, on the eve of the court hearing date for approval of the Silver Point
Capital commitment letter, Hostess agreed to sign a confidentiality agreement to provide Yucaipa with access to information for four weeks. 75
In November of 2007, the court approved the terms of the Silver Point
Capital commitment letter, even though the Teamsters argued that a key
condition precedent would never materialize, as they would never agree to a
deal with management. 76 Meanwhile, the clock was ticking on Yucaipa's access to its diligence materials. During this four week window, Hostess and
the official committee of unsecured creditors kept Yucaipa busy. Hostess and
the committee filed a Rule 2004 motion and served subpoenas on Yucaipa
and Bimbo demanding disclosure of the terms of their arrangement with the
Teamsters, which motion the court denied.7 7 Hostess also unsuccessfully
moved to expedite that deadline, arguing that the Teamster's exclusivity
agreement with Yucaipa was interfering with Hostess's ability to confirm a
plan of reorganization. 78
72

Tucaipa Joins Bid to Buy Twinkies Maker, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 3, 2007, available at http://artices.la

times.com/2007/nov/03/business/fi-burkle3.
75
The Yucaipa Companies, LLC's (A) Objection to Motion for Authorization to Enter Into Exit
Facility Commitment Letter and Related Relief, (B) Opposition to Continuation and/or Extension of the
Debtors' Exclusive Periods Within Which to File and Solicit Acceptance of a Plan and (C) Request for
Order Compelling the Debtors to Enter Into Reasonable Confidentiality Agreement and Provide Access
to Due Diligence at 4, Hostess I, Case 04-45814, Doc. 9680.
74
1d.
"See Yucaipa Companies, LLC's Objection to Debtor's Motion for an Expedited Order Pursuant to
11 U.S.C. Section 105(d) Setting Deadline for the Yucaipa Companies, LLC and/or the International
Brotherhood of Teamsters to File a Plan or Disclosure Statement at 7, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc.

9923.

-

7Opposition of the International Brotherhood of Teamsters to (A) Continuation of and/or Further
Extension of Exclusive Period; and (B) Motion for Authorization to Enter into Exit Facility Commitment
Letter and Related Relief at 2, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 9682 ("The Debtors apparently took
the step of filing a motion seeking this Court's authorization to enter into exit facility financing under the
unrealistic belief that they would meet the critical conditions of such financing, including one condition
that the Debtors themselves made impossible, namely negotiating a national bargaining agreement with the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters.").
"Motion of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors for an Order Pursuant to Rule 2004 of
the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Directing the Production of Documents by Yucaipa Companies, LLC, Bimbo Bakeries, USA, BBU, Inc. and New Bakery, Inc. and the Examination of Witnesses
[hereinafter Committee Discovery Motion]; Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 9803; Order Denying
Committee Discovery Motion, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 9849.
"Motion for Order Regarding Setting Deadline for the Yucaipa Companies, LLC or the International
Brother of Teamsters to File a Plan and Disclosure Statement at 5-6, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc.

9919.
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Ultimately, Yucaipa's diligence time expired without a formal proposal,
and the Yucaipa/Teamsters/Bimbo alliance eventually dissolved.79 True to
their word, the Teamsters refused to bargain with management, and the Silver Point Capital commitment letter expired by its terms.
Ripplewood Holdings LLC, a private equity firm, then submitted a commitment letter to fund the debtor's emergence from Chapter 11 with an equity investment of $44.2 million and debt financing of $670 million, secured
by liens on substantially all of Hostess's assets.80
As with the Silver Point commitment letter, the Ripplewood exit financing was conditioned on the debtor's obtaining concessions from the two main
unions-the International Brotherhood of Teamsterss' and the Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union. 82 The
court approved the exit financing agreement on October 3, 2008,83 and Hostess filed a motion to reject its collective bargaining agreements in February
2008.84 Hostess was able to negotiate settlements with the Bakers union but
was unable to do so with the Teamsters. Even though the Teamsters refused
to bargain with management, they eventually bargained directly with Ripplewood, agreeing to the necessary concessions and receiving in return a
seven percent equity interest in the emerging entity.85
79

InterstateBakeries Bid Deadline Passes with No Yucaipa Plan, KANSAS CITY Bus.
available at http://www.bizjournals.com/losangeles/stories/2008/01/14/daily27.html.

soMotion for Entry of an Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§§

J.

(June 6, 2008),

105(a), 363(b), 364(c)(1), 503(b) and 507(a)

Authorizing the Debtors to (I) Enter into Equity Commitment Letter and Related Agreements Including
(A) Equity Commitment Fee Letter, (B) Revolving Facility Commitment Letter and Related Fee Letter,
and (C) Term Loan Exit Facility Commitment Letter, and (II) Pay Certain Fees and Expenses Associated
Therewith, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 11287.
1
s Motion for Order Under 11 U.S.C. § 1113(c) Authorizing Rejection of Collective Bargaining
Agreements at 7, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 10304.
"Disclosure Statement at 6, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 11334:
A key component of the First Amended Plan was an exit facility commitment letter
and related agreements for up to $400 million in exit financing (the 'Silver Point
Commitment') with Silver Point Finance, LLC ('Silver Point'). The Silver Point
Commitment was comprised of a $120 million senior secured revolving credit facility, a $60 million senior secured term loan facility and a $220 million letter of credit
facility. The Silver Point Commitment contained various conditions to the commitments contemplated thereunder, including the ratification of amendments to the
collective bargaining agreements governing the relationship between the Debtors
and their unionized workforce necessary to implement the Business Plan and the
condition that an order by the Bankruptcy Court confirming the First Amended
Plan be entered no later than March 14, 2008.

"Order Pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

§

105(a), 363(b), 364(c)(1), 503(b) and 507(a), Authorizing the Debt,

ors to (I) Enter into Equity Commitment Letter and Related Agreements Including (A) Equity Commitment Fee Letter, (B) Revolving Facility Commitment Letter, and (C) Term Loan Exit Facility
Commitment and (II) Pay Certain Fees and Expenses, Hostess 1, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 11367.
84
Motion, supra note 81, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 10304.
85
Letter from Richard Volpe, Director, Bakery and Laundry Conference, to Teamster members em-
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HOSTESS

(Vol. 89

II

Hostess emerged from bankruptcy under new leadership and new labor
agreements, but was saddled with even more secured debt than it had before
the bankruptcy. After spending a remarkably long four and a half years in its
first bankruptcy,86 Hostess finally emerged. However, as many pointed out,
the company's prospects were not bright as the exit finance plan left the
debtors deeply indebted. The new investors paid $44.2 million in cash and
borrowed $670 million, secured by Hostess's assets. 87 Thus, Hostess entered
bankruptcy with approximately $650 million in secured debt and exited with
$670 million in secured debt.
Saddled by these heavy post-emergence debt loads, Hostess filed a second
bankruptcy a mere three years after emerging from its first case.88 This time,
the company stated that the objectives of the Chapter 11 proceeding were
primarily about labor unions: the chief executive officer of Hostess stated
that the "purpose and focus" of this second reorganization was to achieve for
the Hostess companies "dramatic change to their labor agreements, with a
corresponding material reduction in their cost structure and legacy pension
and medical obligations, and a restructuring of their capital structure."

9

Hostess described the "threshold obstacle" to its reorganization effort as
[A]n inflated cost structure that has put them at a profound
competitive disadvantage. And that is so because the biggest
component of the Debtors' costs - their obligations under
collective bargaining agreements that cover nearly 15,000 active union employees - has never been meaningfully addressed. Nor have there been any significant modifications to
union pension plan obligations or to the provisions in the
collective bargaining agreements that limit the Debtors' opportunities to grow revenues. Hostess simply cannot emerge
as a viable competitor unless they are relieved of significant
financial commitments and arcane work rules imposed by
their collective bargaining agreements. 90
ployed by Interstate Bakeries Corporation (Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://bankrupt.com/misc/
Teamsters CBAModificationHighlights.pdf.
"5According to the UCLA-LoPucki Business Bankruptcy Database, the mean duration of a large corporate reorganization is 675 days and the median duration 523 days. UCLA-LoPucki Bankruptcy Research Database, available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu. The 1,535 days of the first Hostess bankruptcy
was in the ninetieth percentile of case duration. Id.
87
See Disclosure Statement, Hostess I, Case No. 04-45814, Doc. 10133.
"In re Old HB, Inc. (f/k/a Hostess Brands, Inc.), et al., Case No. 12-22052 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 11,
2012) [hereinafter Hostess II].
"Affidavit of Brian J. Driscoll in Support of First Day Motions and in Accordance with Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2 at 3, Hostess II, Doc. 3.
'See Debtor's Emergency Motion for Interim and Final Orders Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 365,
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Along with Hostess's bankruptcy petition, the company filed two motions that set the company on a path for litigation with its unions. First, it
moved to schedule a hearing on the as-yet filed motions to reject its collective
bargaining agreements 91 This motion contemplated a fast-track process for
§ 1113, with a motion to be filed on or before January 25, 2012, responses
due two weeks later, replies due two weeks after that, and a trial to start a
week after that-that is, the debtor planned to file a motion on January 25
and start trial February 27.92

Second, Hostess filed a motion for interim approval of its DIP financing
agreement, under which Silver Point Capital would lend $75,000,000 on a
secured basis to fund Hostess's second reorganization.9 3 That DIP loan
agreement was conditioned on Hostess pursuing an expedited reorganization
schedule, particularly with respect to obtaining labor concessions. In particular, the DIP agreement required that Hostess submit proposed modifications
to its collective bargaining agreement within a day of the bankruptcy filing;
that it move to reject its collective bargaining agreements within two weeks
of the bankruptcy filing; and that it obtain relief from its collective bargaining
agreements within 75 days of the bankruptcy filing.94
In accordance with this schedule, Hostess moved to reject its collective
bargaining agreements with the International Brotherhood of Teamsters and
the Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International union two weeks later, on January 25, 2012.95 These two unions represented nearly ninety-two percent of the debtors' unionized workforce.9 6
The proposed modifications to the Bakers' collective bargaining agreement
sought to obtain $100 million in concessions.9 7 Hostess argued that these
concessions were necessary because the company was "experiencing a cash
'burn' of $2 million a week" and "[t]he Debtors' struggles are attributable
almost exclusively to an inflated cost structure that has put them at a
profound competitive disadvantage. And that is so because the biggest component of the Debtors' costs-their obligations under collective bargaining
agreements that cover their nearly 15,000 active union employees-has never
and 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code Approving Plan to Wind Down the Debtors' Business and for Other
Relief [hereinafter Wind Down Motion] at 10, Hostess II, Doc. 1710 (quoting the Motion to Reject
Collective Bargaining Agreements, Hostess II, Doc. 24).
"Motion for Scheduling Order in Connection with Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreement, Hostess II, Doc. 24.
92
1d. at 14-16.
93
Hostess II, Doc. 36.
94
Debtor's Motion for Interim and Final Orders Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post Petition Financing, Use Cash Collateral and Provide Adequate Protection at 38, Hostess II, Doc. 36.
"Debtor's Motion to Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements, Hostess II, Doc. 174.
9
6Debtor's Motion for Scheduling Order in Connection with Motion to Reject Certain Collective
Bargaining Agreements at 8, Hostess II, Doc. 24.
97
Response to Motion to Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements at 3, Hostess II, Doc. 298.
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been meaningfully addressed."98
The Bakers refused to participate in the § 1113 litigation, instead insisting that it remained open to negotiation as long as management was willing
to address the company's capital structure and to ensure that the Bakers (1)
would be compensated in future earnings on account of their concessions and
(2) would have job security in the event the bakeries were sold to a third
party.9 9 The Bakers refused to participate in the litigation to reject their
collective bargaining agreements, insisting that it would devote its efforts
instead to addressing these three concerns and warning that the Bakers were
willing to strike if management refused to engage in these issues, even though
a strike would almost certainly push Hostess into liquidation. 100
Management refused to engage the Bakers on these issues and, instead,
pursued the motion to reject the Bakers' collective bargaining agreements.
The court granted Hostess's motion to reject the Bakers collective bargaining
agreements, meaning that the Bakers were left without a collective bargaining
agreement in place.' 0
The Teamsters opposed the motion to reject the collective bargaining
agreements. The bases for their objections were similar to the principles
enunciated by the Bakers: Hostess's bargaining posture was inappropriate because Hostess "continues to reject outright the Union's proposals for a viable
capital structure, adequate corporate protections, fair and equitable concessions by all parties, and continued participation in the multi-employer pension
plans."1o2
"Debtor's Motion to Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements at It 7-9, Hostess II, Doc.
174.
99
Response to Motion to Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements at 3-4, Hostess II, Doc.
298 (listing four bargaining requirements: 1) that the emerging company will have a capital structure that
would maximize the prospects of long-term survival of the company; 2) that the BCTGM-represented
employees will receive meaningful return for their concessions in the form of real participation in any upside future of the company; 3) that the company commits to serious capital investment in its facilities; and
4) that any agreement provides some measure of job security for existing Hostess employees in the event
the company sells its assets to third parties).
"oold. at 4 ("To maximize the possibility of a successful outcome, the BCTOM has concluded that,
rather than expend its resources in litigation, it will devote its full time and attention to the only issue that
matters - the negotiation of an acceptable agreement with the Debtors. The BCTCM believes that concentrated attention to negotiations will minimize the possibility of a strike, an event that, as the Debtors
have represented, see Memorandum of Law in Support of Debtors' 1113/1114 Motion (Docket No. 175),
at pp. 19-20, and the Committee of Unsecured Creditors has recognized, see Objection to Debtors' Motion
to Obtain DIP Financing (Docket No. 231), at p. 3, would lead to liquidation of the Company.").
o'Order (I) Granting Debtors' Motion to (A) Reject Certain Collective Bargaining Agreements and
(B) Modify Certain Retiree Benefit Obligations Pursuant to Sections 1113(c) and 1114(g) of the Bankruptcy Code, as to the Bakery, Confectionary, Tobacco Workers and Grain Millers International Union
Collective Bargaining Agreements Described Herein; and (II) Granting BCT's Motion to Dismiss the
Debtors' 1113/1114 Motion as to the Terminated BCT Collective Bargaining Agreements Described
Herein, Hostess II, Doc. 848.
"o2Objection of Interstate Brands Corp.-International Brotherhood of Teamsters National Negotiat-
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The court denied Hostess's motion to reject the Teamsters' collective
bargaining agreement, but with leave to amend.103 Hostess and the Teamsters finally reached a settlement; however, Hostess still had to reach an accord with the Bakers.
Having rejected its collective bargaining agreements, Hostess was free to
either negotiate a new collective bargaining agreement or to impose new
terms on the old collective bargaining agreement. 104 When Hostess began
implementing the modifications to these collective bargaining agreements in
October 2012, the Bakers union began to strike.1a5 The strikes disrupted
operations and triggered default provisions in their bankruptcy financing (the
Final DIP Order), thus prompting Hostess to file a motion proposing procedures to wind down the business.'o 6 At the hearing to discuss that motion,
the parties agreed to mediation to attempt to resolve the strike and permit
Hostess to reorganize.' 0 7 Judge Drain expressed some hope that mediation
might be effective, noting that the Bakers' points of contention were shared
with the Teamsters, who had earlier settled their dispute with Hostess.' 0 8
Expressing frustration and consternation with the Bakers' decision to strike,
the Court noted that, even though it lacked power to enjoin the strike, that
it did have the power to award "monetary claims against a union for an unlawful strike, or a strike that is basically improper, it contravenes another
law."1o,

After the final mediation failed, the court approved the wind down procedures, and the Hostess assets were sold to various buyers." 0 These buyers
have kept many of the old Hostess brands and bakeries running since then.
ing Committee to the Debtors' Motion to Reject Collective Bargaining Agreements Pursuant to Sections
1113 and 1114 of the Bankruptcy Code at 10, Hostess II, Doc. 408.
113Fifth Order Authorizing the Rejection of Certain Unexpired Leases and Executory Contracts and
Setting Bar Date, Hostess II, Doc. 1064.
1 4
1 The Bankruptcy Code simply gives the debtor in possession the right to reject collective bargaining
agreements, but it does not define the consequences of such rejection. Courts have considered rejection to
have a similar impact as bargaining to impasse under the National Labor Relations Act: at that point, the
debtor may impose the terms of its last rejected proposal on the old collective bargaining agreement.
"osWind Down Motion at 16, Hostess II, Doc. 1710.
'o6Id. at 16-17.
07
Transcript Regarding Hearing Held on Nov. 19, 2012, Hostess II, Doc. 2064.
1 0 Id. at 17-18.
09
Id. at 18-19.
"oFinal Order, Pursuant to Sections 105, 363, 365 and 503(c) of the Bankruptcy Code (A) Approving
(1) A Plan to Wind Down the Debtors' Businesses, (II) The Sale of Certain Assets, (III) Going-Out-OfBusiness Sales at the Debtors' Retail Stores, (IV) the Debtors' Use of Cash Collateral and Modifications
to Final DIP Order, (V) An Employee Retention Plan, (VI) A Management Incentive Plan, (VII) Protections for Certain Employees Implementing the Winddown of The Debtors' Businesses, (VIII) The Use of
Certain Third party Contractors and (IX) Procedures for the Expedited Rejection of Contracts and
Leases; and (B) Authorizing the Debtors to Take any and all Actions Necessary to Implement the Winddown, Hostess II, Doc. 1871.
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While the Bakers Union had assumed that the new owners would re-open
the old factories and hire the old workers, so far the new owners have only
re-hired twenty to twenty-five percent of the former workers, none of whom
are unionized."' Whether or not the new employees will organize remains
to be seen.
C. AMR
American Airlines (AMR) had flirted with bankruptcy for nearly 10
years before finally filing on November 29, 2011.112 It had managed to avoid
following every other legacy carrier into bankruptcy for so long in large part
because of significant labor concessions from its unions in 2003, to the tune of
$1.8 billion annually." 3
AMR expressed its objective as restructuring its cost structure-including its labor costs-and to emerge as a stand-alone entity. AMR contended
that it required further reductions in labor costs because each of its major
competitors had gone through bankruptcy and lowered labor costs through
that process, leaving AMR with the highest labor costs among the major
network carriers.114
Even though AMR would be an attractive target for competitors, some
analysts believed that AMR would be able to remain independent."' In
part, this was because AMR went into bankruptcy with a record amount of
cash reserves, enabling AMR to eschew DIP financing." 6 In the absence of a
DIP lender, who as discussed above could exert significant leverage over
AMR, it was believed that AMR would be better able to retain control
through the Chapter 11 process.' 7
Other creditors, however, exerted significant control over the case, in
particular the creditors' committee, the pilots' union, and the ad hoc committee of bondholders."is The unsecured creditors' committee-whose members
n..Akane Otani, Hostess Twinkies Return to Stores, But Unionized jobs Disappear, THE CHRISTIAN
Sc. MONIToR, July 15, 2013, http://www.csmonitor.com/Business/2013/0715/Hostess-Twinkies-re

turn-to-stores-but-unionized-jobs-disappear-video.
" 21n re AMR Corp., et al., Case No. 11-15463 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y., Nov. 29, 2011).
11
3Affidavit of Isabella D. Goren Pursuant to Local Bankruptcy Rule 1007-2, In re AMR, Case No.
11-15463, Doc 4.
114
1d. at ¶ 19.
"'Mary Schlangenstein & Mary Jane Credeur, AMR Mutes Takeover Risk with Record $4.1 Billion
Cash Entering Bankruptcy, BLOOMBERc, Dec. 5, 2011, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
2011-12-05/amr-mutes-takeover-risk-with-record-4-1 -billion-bankruptcy-cash.html.
"'Id.

&

' 18Mike Spector & Susan Carey, Attorney was AMR Deal Key, WALL ST. J., Feb. 8, 2013, at C1
(reporting that the creditors' committee "filed an unusual 'mission statement' that declared, among other
things, that the creditors committee's 'oversight responsibilities are highlighted and particularly essential'
since the airline didn't have a bankruptcy loan requiring it to meet certain milestones."); Mike Spector
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included the Allied Pilots Association, the Transport Workers Union, and
the Association of Professional Flight Attendants"19-expressed its concerns
early in the case "that the Debtors' reorganization cases are neither a labor
transformation nor a debt recapitalization exercise; instead, transformation
challenges surrounding revenue, city share, network, fleet, product, labor and
capital structure must be creatively resolved."1 20 The committee declared
that it would take an extraordinarily active role in overseeing the Chapter 11
case in response to the absence of a DIP lender.121
An ad hoc committee of creditors consisting of several large claim holders,
including Barclays, Goldman Sachs, and J.P. Morgan,1 22 exerted significant
influence, as they collectively held sufficient claims to block any plan of reorganization.1 23 This group initially supported AMR's plan to emerge as an
independent entity, and it offered to finance AMR's exit from bankruptcy.
That exit financing, however, was contingent on the appointment of a new
board of directors.124
The pilots' union was another influential group. They engaged in at least
three lines of attack to derail AMR's reorganization plan. First, the pilots'
union reached an agreement with US Airways, memorialized in a memorandum of understanding that "would serve as a framework for an agreement" if
the airlines merged.125 This unusual step was a public signal of the pilots'
support for a merger, and it provided a means for other creditors to assess the
viability and value of such a merger.
Second, the pilots negotiated with other creditors to push for the US
Matt Wirz, Distressed Investors Circle AMR, WALL ST. J., Oct. 12, 2012, at Cl (reporting that the ad
hoc group of bondholders played an important role in plan negotiations due to its blocking position).
"See Appointment of Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, In re AMR Corp., Case No. 1115463, Doc. 128 (listing the committee members, including Manufacturers and Traders Trust Company,
Wilmington Trust Company, The Bank of New York Mellon, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp., HewlettPackard Enterprise Services, LLC, and Boeing Capital Corporation, in addition to the three unions).
"Statement

Dec. 22, 2011, at
121Id. at¶

of the Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors Regarding Matters to be Heard on

¶5,

In re AMR Corp., Case No. 11-5463, Doc. 403.

7.

12'Supplemental Verified Statement of the Ad Hoc Committee of AMR Corporation Creditors Pursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 2019, In re AMR Corp., Case No. 11-15463, Doc. 5585
(listing Barclays Asset Management Group LLC, Goldman, Sachs & Co. (solely with respect to the Distressed Products Group), and J.P. Morgan Securities LLC).
"'In order to confirm a plan of reorganization, the debtor must obtain the approval of each impaired
class of creditors, unless the debtor can satisfy the requirements of 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b). 11 U.S.C.
1 129(a)(8). A class has accepted a plan if at least two-thirds in dollar amount and one-half in number of
claim holders have approved the plan. 11 U.S.C. 1126(c).
"Jack Nicas & Mike Spector, Creditors Want New Board if AMR Stays Single, WALL ST.

J.,

Nov.

30, 2012, at B2.
125Scott Alwyn, American Airlines Pilots Approve MOU for Agreements Under Merger, REUTERS,
Dec. 29, 2012, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/30/us-american-airlines-pilots-idUS-

BRE8BTOON20121230 (quoting board of the Allied Pilots Association).
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Airways merger.1 2 6 The pilots eventually agreed to a new collective bargaining agreement with American Airlines at the urging of the creditors' committee, as such an agreement would allow other creditors to compare the standalone versus merger plans. They also received support from the powerful Ad
Hoc Committee of AMR Creditors. After that committee expressed interest
in funding a stand-alone plan of reorganization, it sent a letter to the pilots'
union emphasizing that its "support for a stand-alone Plan of Reorganization
for AMR will be conditioned, among other things, on that Plan providing for
a new Board of Directors."1 2 7 The pilots' union spokesman characterized the
importance of this letter as follows: "Having a role in determining the right
leadership and strategic plan for the company is of vital importance to our
pilots, and we now have a commitment from this significant creditor group to
help us pursue that goal."l 2 8
And third, the pilots' union engaged in more "classic" resistance to
AMR's reorganization plan. They opposed AMR's motion to reject their
collective bargaining agreements, hiring Wall Street legal and financial advisers to support their litigation efforts. 12 9 They conducted a strike vote-even
though the bankruptcy court could enjoin such a strike once AMR rejected
the collective bargaining agreement. And they purportedly engaged in a
work slowdown,1 30 using tactics known as "work-to-rule" in which pilots
would report maintenance issues that would not normally be reported, even
though they technically were required to do so. 1 3
Ultimately, with the support of the bondholders, and following months of
contentious labor relations and related deterioration in customer service,
management abandoned its plan to emerge as a stand-alone carrier and ultimately merged with US Airways after receiving requisite approval from
creditors, the court, and regulators.1 32
26

1 Andrea Ahles, Anatomy of a Merger: How American, US Airways joined, FORT WORTH STAR
TELEGRAM, Feb. 17, 2003, http://www.star-telegram.com/2013/02/17/4626182/anatomy-of-a-mergerhow-american.html (describing role of pilots' union in paving way for merger talks and in participating
with the other creditors through the creditors' committee).
7
'2 Letter from Gerard Uzzi of Milbank, Tweed & McCloy on Behalf of the Ad Hoc Comm. of AMR
Creditors to Keith Wilson, President of the APA (available at Terry Maxon, DALLAS MORNING NEWS
AIRLINE Biz BLOG (Nov. 24, 2012), http://aviationblog.dallasnews.com/2012/1 1/apa-weve-got-a-commit
ment-for-a-new'independent-amr-board-of-directors.html).
12'Nicas & Spector, supra note 124.
29
1 Steven Pearlstein, Two Can Play the Airline Bankruptcy Game, WASH. POST, April 28, 2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/steven-pearlstein-two-can-play-the-airline-bankruptcy-game/

2012/04/27/gIQAJ239nTstory.html.
30

oGeorge Howell, 3rd American Airlines Flight in a Week Experiences Loose Seats, CNN, Oct. 3,
2012, http://www.cnn.com/2012/10/03/travel/american-airlines-problem/
"'AmericanAirlines' Bumpy Ride: Loose Seats, Smoky Cabins and Labor Disputes, PBS NEWSHOUR,
Oct. 3, 2012, http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/business/july-decl2/airlines_10-03.html
3
' 2The Bankruptcy Court approved AMR's plan of reorganization on October 21, 2013. See In re
AMR Corp., Case No. 11-15463, Doc 11402. The merger received regulatory approval in April 2014.
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III. IMPLICATIONS FOR BANKRUPTCY LAW
As illustrated in the cases above, the struggle among creditors to control
the corporate reorganization can directly threaten the interests of workers.
The two attempted restructurings of Hostess provide examples of how controlling creditors may require the debtor to re-work its collective bargaining
agreements as a condition to providing financing for the reorganization. And
as seen in Hostess II and the AMR reorganization, adjusting labor costs may
be the primary purpose of the bankruptcy filing,
Labor unions clearly had an important role in these cases as bargaining
agents in the § 1113 rejection process. But these cases also show that this
was not labor unions' only role. In fact, the Hostess bakers' union refused to
even engage in the concession bargaining process, declining to oppose the
motion to reject their collective bargaining agreement. Instead, they expressed their desire to negotiate over bankruptcy strategy. The AMR pilots
did both-they engaged in concession bargaining while at the same time explored alliances to change the course of the bankruptcy proceedings.
With both of these debtors, the unions' arguments were unsuccessful at
opposing the debtor's motion to reject the collective bargaining agreements,
but they were successful in attracting the attention of other creditors. In
AMR's case, the pilots' union's arguments were rejected by the court in the
§ 1113 litigation, but they were accepted by the bondholders and by AMR's
merger partner. In Hostess I, although the agreement between the Teamsters
and Yucaipa ultimately proved ineffective, the union was successful in finding
a partner to attempt to solve what it identified as managerial slack. These
cases, then, provide examples of how labor union activism in bankruptcy can
impact bankruptcy governance.
There is good reason, then, to believe that labor unions can impact a
corporate reorganization and potentially protect labor's interests in bankruptcy by forging alliances in the competition for control. But is this activism
good for bankruptcy governance?
An evaluation of whether labor activism is good for bankruptcy governance is complicated because, as has long been recognized, "governance questions are inextricably bound up in the broader policy question of what goals
Chapter 11 should seek to promote." 3 3 Corporate reorganization is designed
to promote reorganization and to maximize returns to creditors.134 At times,
See David McLaughlin & Andrew Zajac, American Airlines-US Airways Merger Settlement Approved,
BLOOMBERG, April 26, 2014, http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-25/american-airlines-settle
ment-over-us-airways-merger-approved.html.
.. Christopher W. Frost, The Theory, Reality and Pragmatismof Corporate Governance in Bankruptcy
Reorganizations,72 AM. BANKR. L.J. 103, 105 (1998).
34
" Harner, supra note 6, at 476 ('The primary goals of Chapter 11 are to rehabilitate corporate debtors and maximize recoveries to creditors.").
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these goals may be consistent, as rehabilitating the debtor may be the best
way to maximize creditor recoveries. At other times, though, maximizing
creditor returns may require liquidating the firm.135 Thus, from an outcome-

based view of bankruptcy, it is difficult to assess whether labor activism is
good for bankruptcy. In the AMR case, labor activism may have helped with
both goals. In the Hostess cases, labor activism may have maximized returns
to creditors (arguably) but did not promote reorganization.
From a process-oriented perspective, however, labor activism has the potential to improve bankruptcy governance. The potential added value from
labor activism is primarily informational: it provides a means for workers to
contribute to the reorganization by identifying managerial slack.
Yucaipa, the investment fund that partnered with the Teamsters in Hostess's first bankruptcy, has explained that one of the reasons it has sought
alliances with unions is for their informational advantage: "cooperative union
members provide 'phenomenal' information about potential deals and good
business practices" as "[u]nion workers know more than anyone about 'the
company, the management, the competitive environment and everything else'
at their companies."1 3 6
Providing information does not assure that the process will properly balance bankruptcy's two policies, but it does provide the opportunity for improved governance in bankruptcy. As Anderson and Ma conclude in their
empirical analysis comparing § 363 sale prices with prices obtained through a
confirmed plan of reorganization, the lower sale prices through § 363 sales
are not due to the speed of such sales or to the financial distress of the seller;
rather, they conclude that the lower prices "appear to be associated with the
diminished creditor negotiation leverage in 363 sales."1 37
This information does not necessarily promote reorganization or liquidation. Instead, it can improve creditor negotiations that can lead to maximizing asset value.
This basic argument that labor union's monitoring information can improve bankruptcy governance has a direct corollary in the corporate governance literature. Kenneth Dau-Schmidt, for instance, has argued that an
alliance between capital and labor could greatly improve monitoring of management by combining shareholders' control rights with labor's inside infor35

Frost, supra note 133, at 105 ("In general, we seem to expect that the process of rehabilitation will
serve both the goals of maximizing the value of the business assets, thereby maximizing creditors' returns,
and restoring businesses to health so that they can continue to provide benefits to employees and other
noninvestor stakeholders. The problem is that meeting both of these goals is impossible when liquidation is
the choice that maximizes the value of the business assets.").
"'Joseph N. DiStefano, Investor Who Works Well with Unions Ron Burkle is a Likely Bidder for The
Inquirer, PHILA. INQUIRER, Mar. 26, 2006, http://articles.philly.com/2006-03-26/business/25414666_1
yucaipa-spokesman-frank-quintero-inquirer-and-daily-news-biggest-unions.
137
Anderson & Ma, supra note 15, at 17.
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mation regarding the firm's operations. 38 That is, labor-stakeholder alliances
can improve corporate governance outside of bankruptcy. Likewise, laborstakeholder alliances, in which labor unions contribute their inside information into the market for corporate control, have the potential to improve
governance in corporate reorganizations. This is especially true in those cases
in which there is competition for creditor control, as "[t]he marketization of
reorganization law has placed a greater premium on information."'3 9

IV. EMPLOYEE COMMITTEES
Labor union participation in the competition for control cannot solve the
inefficiencies in bankruptcy, but it can take steps to improving them. Issues
such as asset sale procedures, the right to credit bid, and the propriety of
breakup fees in bankruptcy are all important topics that must be addressed in
the Bankruptcy Code in order to improve asset sales. Labor unions cannot
solve these problems; however, they can provide information that can lessen
the consequences of these problems. Further, labor unions not only have the
ability to contribute, but as long-term investors they have the incentive to do
so.
This final section of the paper considers whether the Bankruptcy Code
can and should provide for an employee committee to provide such informational sharing.
Labor unions are an effective vehicle for providing information about the
debtor-employer. For one, labor unions have experience and sophistication in
the corporate reorganization process. In addition, labor unions have a history
with both the particular debtor as well as with the industry. That is, they
not only serve as the vehicle for packaging and delivering employees' insights
as to internal operations, but labor unions also may provide additional knowledge as to the corporation and its industry.
At the same time, labor unions have traits that may limit their effectiveness. For one, there are agency costs inherent in labor unions, as the union
may at times have interests that diverge from the workers.14 0 For instance, a
"'Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, PromotingEmployee Voice in the American Economy: A Call for Comprehensive Reform, 94 MARQ. L. REV. 765, 802 (2011).
"'See Lipson & DiVirgilio, supra note 7, at 695 (2010) (in presenting framework for evaluating
schemes for the regulation of information in bankruptcy, the authors characterize the importance of information in the struggle for corporate control as follows: 'We used to fight about more substantive matters
in reorganization: cash collateral, adequate protection, exclusivity, and plan confirmation, to name a few.
Today, we increasingly fight about information, or the rules that exist to control its flow. This is not
surprising. The marketization of reorganization has placed a greater premium on information-especially
about the company and its stakeholders.").
40
' See Richard A. Epstein, Agency Costs, Employment Contracts, and Labor Unions, in PRINCIPALS
AND AGENTS: THE STRUCTURE OF BUSINEss 127, 144 (John W. Pratt & Richard J. Zeckhauser eds.,
1985) ('Generally speaking, successful unionization must simultaneously address two separate agency
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union may prefer to see a company liquidate than to see it emerge by paying
lower wages, as those lower wages might push down wages in other companies where the union represents workers. 141 The employees, however, may
be willing to accept the lower wages in exchange for continued employment.
Agency costs may arise as well due to conflicts between the national and
local chapters.14 2
Probably the biggest limit on the effectiveness of labor unions is a practical one: fewer and fewer employees are members of labor unions. Only 6.7%
of the private sector workforce was unionized in 2013,14 and as private sector union representation declines, labor unions are less likely to play any role
at all in corporate reorganizations.
This low unionization rate may be a consequence, in part, of the bankruptcies of large corporations. As firms have been able to use bankruptcy to
reject their collective bargaining agreements and depress wages and benefits,
employees have come to question the value of unionization. 1 44 As one firm
reduces wages-nd benefits through bankruptcy, other firms in that industry
likewise may depress wages throughout that firm's industry.145 Indeed, this
is what has happened in the airlines, as one airline's ability to reduce labor
costs in bankruptcy has become a means to justify reducing wages among
problems. The firm has to worry about the abuses of its agents, the employees, while the employees have
to worry about the abuses of their agents, the union representatives. If, moreover, some portion of the
wage gains of the individual workers represents monopoly profits (including quasi-rents), the dangers of
abuse by union leaders are even greater, since they have the constant opportunity of diverting some
portion of the surplus (in payment for services rendered, as it were) without driving union members down
to a competitive wage.")
"4"Steven Kropp, Collective Bargaining in Bankruptcy: Toward an Analytical Framework for Section
1113, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 708 (1993) ("Workers and their unions recognize that unless an entire
industry, or at least the entire competitive segment of the relevant labor market, is unionized, then the
companies that are unionized generally will be disadvantaged. . . . Since a bankrupt company may be
permitted to pay lower than union wages, it is probably better that some companies go out of business,
rather than survive through bankruptcy and lead the entire industry to pay lower and lower wage rates.").
1'Abigail Evans, Cooperation or Co-Optation: When Does A Union Become Employer-Dominated
Under Section 8(a)(2) of the National Labor Relations Act?, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047 (2000)
(describing local-national conflicts at Saturn: "Other conflicts arose not only between the union and Saturn management, but within the union internally. There is an inevitable conflict of interest between the
local and the national UAW. The national has understandable difficulties representing the interests of all
of GM's UAW workers, and not just the interests of the Saturn plant.").
""'Economic News Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Members Survey (Jan. 24, 2014, 10:00
AM) available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm
144Ellen J. Dannin & Terry H. Wagar, Lawless Law? The Subversion of the National Labor Relations
Act, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 197, 211 (2001) ("Each time a union loses a site, it could be used to demonstrate
the ineffectiveness of unions and the futility of collective bargaining.").
145Steven Kropp, Collective Bargaining in Bankruptcy: Toward an Analytical Framework for Section
1113, 66 TEMP. L. REV. 697, 708 (1993) ("To give a company in bankruptcy the opportunity to operate
with cut-rate labor costs would put wages back into competition. It would also force competitors of the
debtor company into bankruptcy. The result would be a general lowering of wages for all workers in the
affected industry.").
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competitors.1 46
It is possible that labor's participation in the competition for control may
stem the decline in unionization by providing unions a way to protect their
members' interests; however, it is unlikely that this would do much to increase unionization. Labor union decline is attributable to many factors other
than bankruptcy laws, including changes in the modern workplace that "have
rendered many features of existing labor regulation obsolete."14 7
Given this environment, it is worth considering how bankruptcy law
might provide for the benefits of worker participation in bankruptcy governance without the intermediary of labor unions.1 48
In theory, the Bankruptcy Code already provides such a vehicle in the
form of employee committees.1 49 just as the court may approve the appointment of a creditor committee and an equity committee, it may also approve
the appointment of an employee committee.1 50
Some scholars have suggested that employee committees might be effective at improving returns for employees in bankruptcy and at protecting their
interests, particularly when the reorganization is likely to entail mass layoffs.'1'

These suggestions, though, have not generally considered the em-

ployee committee as a participant in governance matters.1 52
Currently, the Bankruptcy Code permits the formation of an employee
14 6

See, e.g., AMR's argument in favor of labor cost reductions in bankruptcy, discussed supra in notes
160-161 and accompanying text: "Unlike the other carriers, however, and with the cooperation of its
employees, AMR was able to stave off bankruptcy by implementing hundreds of initiatives resulting, by
the end of 2004, in annual cost reductions of approximately $4.1 billion. This included reaching consensual
agreements with the labor unions and the non-union employees at American Airlines in the Spring of
2003, which reduced American Airlines' labor costs by approximately $1.8 billion per year. This gave
AMR what was then perceived as an opportunity to return to prosperity and success with competitive
costs. Since that time, however, AMR's major competitors exited chapter 11 with dramatically improved
balance sheets and dramatically reduced costs, including labor costs that are significantly lower than AMR's
labor costs." (emphasis added).

14 7 See,

e.g., KATHERINE V. W. STONE, FROM WIDGETS To DIGITS 124-25 (2004).

1481n

some ways, this section reflects that of labor scholars who have advocated for a labor law for
non-unionized employees. See, e.g., Michael H. Gottesman, In Despair, Starting over: Imagining A Labor
Law for Unorganized Workers, 69 CHL-KENT L. REV. 59 (1993).
14911 U.S.C. § 1102(a) ("[T]he United States trustee shall appoint a committee of creditors holding
unsecured claims and may appoint additional committees of creditors or of equity security holders as the
United States trustee deems appropriate.").
150

1d.

15 t

Skeel, supra note 9 at, 1472-3.
2
's Korobkin, supra note 27, at 29; Matthew L. Seror, Analyzing the Inadequacies of Employee Protections in Bankruptcy, 13 S. CAL. INTERDIsc. L.J. 141, 164 (2003); Skeel, supra note 9, at 1482 ('Given that
directors' hands are tied, and that they have only a limited ability to represent potentially vulnerable
constituencies such as employees who may be laid off, should employees be given another representative to
serve as a counterweight?"); see also Lynn M. LoPucki, A Team Production Theory of Bankruptcy Reorganization, 57 VAND. L. REV. 741, 772 (2004) (considering committee representation as serving to protect
constituents' legal rights, not their team production rights (which loosely correspond to the informal rights
discussed above)).
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committee to serve as a fiduciary to employees. Such committees, however,
are rare and, when formed, serve a narrow function. For example, in Enron's
bankruptcy, an employee committee was formed for the limited purpose of
investigating employee claims against Enron, principally severance payments
allegedly owed.'"
Employee committees might be effective at doing more than just protecting employees' formal rights. They may also provide the valuable monitoring
information that labor unions currently provide. Such committees might actually be more effective at communicating with management than are labor
unions, as it has been suggested that the collective bargaining process may
actually deter management from seeking employee perspective on corporate
decisions.154 That is, an employee committee would provide a vehicle for
employee representation "unbundled" from the collective bargaining
process.'ss
Labor scholars have for decades complained that the NLRA's collective
bargaining protections have prevented worker representatives from participating in corporate governance.15 6 These scholars have argued that worker
representation could improve workplace safety and operations, and that
worker representation may provide valuable information to other stakeholders, particularly shareholders." 7 An employee committee in bankruptcy
could likewise provide these benefits in the corporate reorganization process
by providing worker representation outside of the collective bargaining process and outside the strictures of the National Labor Relations Act.
Despite the potential benefits of employee committees-benefits both to
the employees' interests and to the reorganization process-employee committees are rare and, when formed, are narrowly focused, as discussed
"'As described in the disclosure statement in that case, the employee committee was appointed "for
the limited purpose of investigating issues relating to (a) continuation of health or other benefits for former
employees of the Debtors, (b) the investigation of claims uniquely held by employees, as such, against the
Debtors, (c) the treatment of employees' claims under any plan(s) of reorganization or liquidation, (d)
possible WARN Act violations by the Debtors in discharging employees, (e) possible violation by the
Debtors of state labor laws and certain provisions of ERISA, and (f) dissemination of non-confidential
information relating to items (a) through (e) to employees, former employees, or groups thereof." Disclosure Statement for the Fifth Amended Joint Plan of Affiliated Debtors at 346, In re Enron Corp., Case No.
01-16034, Doc. 15414.
IS4Harper, supra note 66, at 16-17.
'"See supra note 4, attributing this "unbundling" concept to Benjamin I. Sachs.
'"See Thomas A. Kochan, Rethinking and Reframing U.S. Policy on Worker Voice and Representation,
26 ABA J. LAB. & EMPL. L. 231, 242 (2011) (noting proposals to reform § 8(a)(2), including one proposal
for promoting direct employee participation -to ensure that various employee involvement processes and/
or advisory worker-employer task forces or committees are not prohibited by the § 8(a) (2) of the
NLRA."); Katherine Van Wezel Stone, supra note 5, at 77; Michael C. Harper, supra note 66, at 9("However, the principle also prohibits management from influencing unions by placing union leaders in positions
of divided responsibility on corporate boards or other management supervisory committees.").
'"Id.
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supra.'5 8 This may be due to the perceived costs and benefits of appointing
an employee committee, both of which, I suggest, are poorly understood. The
benefits, as mentioned above, are generally overlooked, as courts and commentators tend to view the benefits solely as providing employee protection.
The costs, on the other hand, may be overestimated.
There are both direct and indirect costs of appointing an employee committee. The direct costs consist of paying professionals to represent the employee committee. As a statutory committee appointed by the United States
Trustee, the employee committee may have its professional fees paid out of
the bankruptcy estate. 59 Thus, the employee committee would create a
greater financial burden on the bankruptcy estate, using money that would
have been available for general unsecured creditors in order to pay professionals for the committee. These costs, while perhaps not capable of precise prediction ex ante, are at least familiar and understood.
The indirect costs of appointing an employee committee, on the other
hand, are less clear. These costs arise from the threat that an additional committee may make obtaining approval of a plan of reorganization more difficult
and costly. Perhaps the Bankruptcy Code's most pro-reorganization aspect is
that it largely leaves management free to pursue reorganization efforts. To
the extent an employee committee would constrain management, it may ultimately be making reorganization less likely.160 A similar concern has been
expressed about the appointment of special interest committees in bankruptcy generally.161 Corporate reorganization theory is premised on a compulsory process that will leave creditors collectively better off than they
would be if they each pursued individual collection efforts.1 62 Special interest committees, in contrast, are means for creditors to pursue their own individual interests.1 63
There is certainly some truth underlying these concerns, as the introduction of yet another committee may create additional conflict in the bank1ssSee supra note 153 and accompanying text.
"'11 U.S.C. § 1103(a) (2004) (permitting committee appointed under § 1102 to employ "one or more
attorneys, accountants, or other agents, to represent or perform services for such committee."); II U.S.C.
§ 330(a) (2004) ("[T]he court may award to . . . a professional person employed under section . .. 1103
(A) reasonable compensation for actual, necessary services rendered by the . . . professional person ...
and (B) reimbursement for actual, necessary expenses.").
6
1 0Korobkin, supra note 27, at 31-32 ("The general absence of constraints on managerial decisionmaking reflects the legitimate concern that managers must be free to respond effectively to financial distress.
Obviously, an effective response is in the interests of employees as a group. It would be entirely counterproductive to make managers directly accountable to employees if such accountability comes at the cost of
effective reorganizations.") (footnote omitted).
"'Mary Jo Wiggins, Finance and Factionalism: The Uneasy Present (and Future) of Special Interest

Committees in Corporate Reorganization Law, 41 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 1373, 1382.83 (2004).
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ruptcy process. It may well be that bankruptcy governance is more efficient
with fewer cooks in the kitchen. Indeed, there have been arguments made
that an independent management should have sole control over bankruptcy
decisions (absent fraud or gross mismanagement) and that stakeholders should
be limited to fighting over distributional issues.1 64 Others have argued that
strategic decisions should rest instead in the hands of the residual claimants.16 5 Including management or other non-residual claimants in the decision-making process only leads to inefficient resource allocations.1 66
These concerns, however, are not specific to employee involvement;
rather, these concerns arise from the creditor control dynamics of Chapter 11
bankruptcy in general. Management is not independent in operating the business through reorganization. As discussed supra, managerial discretion may
be extremely limited due to restrictive loan covenants. In addition, managerial turnover both before and during bankruptcy suggests that management is
not in fact independent at all but is instead installed to appease certain stakeholders. Likewise, even though it may be most efficient to allocate decisionmaking powers to residual claimants, these claimants are difficult (some say
impossible) to identify.1 67 Further, the competition for creditor control may
make it highly unlikely that the theoretical residual claimant will have the
power to control the reorganization decisions. Thus, even though there are
valid theoretical reasons to be concerned about including an employee committee, these concerns are removed from current corporate reorganization
practice. As discussed supra, there is reason to believe that employee committees may actually improve bankruptcy governance in this environment of
creditor competition for control.
Even if the inclusion of employee committees generates greater costs, the
benefits from employee committees may well outweigh those costs if the inclusion of employee representation would lead to improved bankruptcy governance. The analysis of labor union participation in bankruptcy governance
suggests that employee representation might be similarly beneficial, provided
that an employee committee can re-create the benefits that a labor union can
provide.
Although an employee committee would mimic labor union representation to the extent it could provide a voice for employees, such a committee
would necessarily have some major differences from a labor union. For one,
there may be several labor unions representing the employees at a single corporation. Each of these bargaining units might further have divergent inter.
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ests. For example, as discussed in the first Hostess reorganization, the
proposed reorganization would place more of a burden on the truck drivers
than on the bakers. Each group had its own union to advance its own interests. A single employee committee might be unable to be responsive to these
individual concerns. In addition, the employee committee may lack the industry knowledge that a union may have. Perhaps most significantly, an employee committee will necessarily lack the bargaining leverage provided under
the federal labor laws, bargaining leverage that the unions exercised in all

three case studies in Part II supra.
Interest divergence within an employee committee is a problem only to
the extent that they would prevent the committee from taking any action.
That is, internal conflicts within the committee might hamper the committee's effectiveness. Similar concerns have been examined in the context of the
statutory unsecured creditors' committee. 168 These concerns may well be
misplaced, as the internal conflict within a committee can actually provide a
forum in which those with divergent interests can bargain with one another.
The result in the creditors' committee context, it has been argued, may be a
compromise that will appeal to a majority of creditors.169 Likewise, internal
conflicts within an employee committee may lead to a richer representation
of employee interests.
As far as the industry knowledge concern, an employee committee may
be able to obtain such knowledge from professionals hired to represent the
committee. For instance, attorneys and financial advisors with experience in a
debtor's particular industry may be able to add a broader industry perspective to the employee committee. Such knowledge, of course, would come at a
cost. Even if this were cost prohibitive, the employee committee would still
be able to contribute firm-specific knowledge and insights, which alone could
provide valuable monitoring information to the other stakeholders.
Finally, an employee committee would likely have less bargaining leverage
than a labor union. A labor union can exert its rights under federal labor
laws to influence bankruptcy governance, just as the Bakers union used the
threat of a strike to pressure Hostess management. Likewise, the pilots'
union in AMR's case had bargaining leverage because of restrictions on replacing pilots. Furthermore, labor unions have bargaining chips because they
are large claimholders-they may have claims for unpaid dues, unpaid wages
and benefits, and unfunded pension plans. They also have collective bargaining agreements that can cover all aspects of the employment relationship, to a
much greater extent than an individual employment contract would. For ex68
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ample, the collective bargaining agreement might restrain the employer from
changing work schedules or from outsourcing work. All of these claims can
be offered in the negotiations with the debtor, controlling creditor, and potential purchasers. The employee committee may be able to bargain regarding claims, but it will likely have less to offer in exchange. In part, this is
because they don't have collective bargaining agreements. In part, this is also
because their informal claims against their employers are not recognized as
claims. Nonetheless, even with this diminished bargaining leverage, an employee committee would still have value to offer in the bankruptcy governance process. It could represent employee interests in the proceedings, e.g. by
objecting to non-ordinary course of business decisions, as well as by providing
insights into firm operations that may be valuable for evaluating a plan of
reorganization or asset sale.
All of this suggests that any hesitation to the appointment of employee
committees may be misguided, as an employee committee can provide value
to a reorganization process that may justify the costs. There are surely practical concerns on the mechanics of such a committee, for example, in determining who would serve on the committee. There are also questions as to
when such a committee should be formed at all. These are surely difficult
questions and merit further consideration, but they are not questions that
would be unique to an employee committee; rather, these are questions that
arise whenever any committee is formed.' 70 For example, a U.S. Trustee
faces these issues when deciding whether to appoint an equity committee or
a retirees' committee. This is not to say that the practical considerations are
unimportant. The point is that in those cases in which there are large numbers of employees, an employee committee can provide a means for employees
to monitor the bankruptcy process and to benefit bankruptcy governance.
V. CONCLUSION
Even though labor union participation in corporate reorganizations is
largely considered to be through concession bargaining, labor unions have also
played a role more akin to that of an activist investor. Labor unions have
used their inside information on the firm's operations to garner alliances with
other stakeholders to influence bankruptcy decision making.
This labor union activism may provide a partial solution to the problems
in bankruptcy governance, specifically, the problem of creditor-driven asset
fire sales. Labor union activism in bankruptcy is not likely the best solution
7

' oSimilar problems may arise in appointing a committee to represent retirees or equity holders. These
problems are also similar to those faced when appointing the official committee of unsecured creditors,
particularly in smaller cases in which it may be harder to find creditors that are willing to serve and that
are representative of creditors generally. See, e.g., Greg M. Zipes & Lisa L. Lambert, Creditors'Committee
Formation Dynamics: Issues in the Real World, 77 AM. BANKR. L.J. 229 (2003).
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to bankruptcy's governance problems; however, it has two main virtues.
First, because labor unions are generally long-term investors in the corporate
employer, labor union activism might provide a counterweight to the powerful creditors that push for quick asset sales in bankruptcy. Second, labor
union activism operates within the current market for corporate control in
Chapter 11 without the need for legislative changes to the Bankruptcy Code.
Finally, this paper suggests that the role of labor unions as information
providers in bankruptcy might possibly be disaggregated from labor unions
altogether. If employee committees could be created for this purpose-something that is theoretically already permissible but which poses practical difficulties-this might provide for information sharing in those cases in which
the debtor has no unionized employees.

